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Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 54 (October 25, 2012)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROVISONS ESTABLISHING CORONER’S INQUEST
REGARDING OFFICER-INVOLVED DEATHS
Summary
In an appeal from the district court upholding all but one provision regarding the
establishment of a coroner’s inquest of officer-involved deaths, the Court determined
whether Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances (CCCO), Title 2, Chapter 2.12
violates due process rights and whether the ordinance intrudes upon the Legislature’s
exclusive authority.
Disposition/Outcome
Provisions requiring a justice of the peace serve as presiding officer in the
coroner’s inquest proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths intrudes on the
Legislature’s exclusive authority over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The
offending provision cannot be severed. Such a severance would require the entire inquest
scheme regarding officer-involved deaths to be struck down because there is no provision
for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer in such
proceedings.
Factual and Procedural History
Nevada Highway Patrol Officers responded to an incident that resulted in a man’s
death, causing inquest proceedings to begin. However, the Clark County Board of
Commissioners amended the coroner’s inquest ordinance before the inquest proceedings
began for the officers. The Nevada Highway Patrol Officers (Appellants) filed separate
complaints in the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the
validity of the amended ordinance based on asserted constitutional violations, which were
later consolidated. Appellants filed motions and applications for both a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the inquest proceedings.
The district court granted a temporary restraining order, and prohibited the inquest
proceedings until court ruled on the injunction. The district court entered judgment
upholding all but one of the Clark County Code sections at issue. The Nevada Highway
Patrol Officers appealed.
Coroner’s Inquest
The board of county commissioners for any county in Nevada is authorized under
NRS 244.163 to create a county coroner’s office. Clark County set forth coroner’s duties
for inquests by enacting the Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances (CCCO), Title 2,
Chapter 2.12. When an officer-involved death occurs, the coroner calls an inquest and a
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presiding officer is selected.2 An officer-involved death occurs when an officer, while
acting in his or her official capacity, uses force that may contribute to the death of a
person. Additionally, an officer-involved death may occur when the officer actively takes
some role in causing a vehicular accident that leads to a person’s death3 and when
circumstances support reasonable grounds to suspect the death was unnatural.4 The chief
judge from the township where the death occurred shall appoint a qualified magistrate5 as
the presiding officer.6 “The presiding officer shall preside over the inquest and shall
insure that the inquest is conducted as an investigatory and fact finding proceeding and
not an adversarial proceeding.”7
Discussion
The Nevada Supreme Court heard the case en banc, and Hardesty wrote the
opinion. Appellants argue due process rights in the Nevada Constitution will be violated
if they are forced to participate in the inquest under the current procedures set forth.
Appellants further contend that the Clark County Board of County Commissioners
(CCBCC), by designating justices of the peace to perform duties, intrude upon the
Nevada Constitution’s express delegation of authority to the Legislature to establish the
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace.
The Court used a de novo standard of review. In the absence of any factual
dispute, this court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory and
injunctive relief de novo.8 In addition, the Court reviews de novo determinations of
whether a statute is constitutional.9
The Clark County Coroner’s Inquest proceeding does not infringe upon due process
guarantees
The language is similar between the due process clause contained in the United
States and Nevada Constitutions,10 permitting the court to look to federal precedent for
guidance in determining violations of the due process clause of the Nevada
Constitution.11 Due process evaluations are done on a case-by-case basis based on the
facts at issue,12 and the level of due process provided depends on the effect the
proceeding will have on a constitutionally protected interest.13
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CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.080(c).
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.010(p).
4
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.010(c).
5
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.010(l) (defining a qualified magistrate as a justice of
the peace from any jurisdiction within Clark County who is an attorney duly licensed to practice law in
Nevada).
6
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.020(e).
7
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.080(m).
8
Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 942, 142 P.3d 339, 347 (2006).
9
Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Att’y Gen., 125 Nev. 502, 509, 217 P.3d 546, 551 (2009).
10
Rodriguez v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 798, 808 n.22, 102 P.3d 41, 48 n.22 (2004).
11
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8(5).
12
Weaver v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 502, 117 P.3d, 193, 199 (2005).
13
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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Appellants assert inquest proceedings impliedly put their liberty and property
interests at stake because the proceedings involve determining the foundation for a
criminal prosecution. Respondents disagree, stating the reason for the inquest is merely to
find facts that may subsequently be used in later actions.
Federal Precedent
Three federal court decisions address similar concerns as those raised by the
appellants. First, in Hannah v. Larche,14 the Court held due process rights do not attached
in the context of an investigatory proceeding. Registrars of voters and private citizens
were called to appear before a commission investigating alleged voting deprivations in
Louisiana.15 The Court considered the procedures possibly causing irreparable harm to
those being investigated. These included procedures that subjected them to public
disgrace or shame, the possibility of losing their jobs, and potential criminal
prosecution.16 The Court determined that “even if such collateral consequences were to
flow from the Commission’s investigations, they would not be the result of any
affirmative determinations made by the Commission, and they would not affect the
legitimacy of the Commission’s investigative function.”17 The Court concluded that due
process rights were not violated because the commission’s procedures were purely
investigative and fact-finding.18
Second, in Jenkins v. McKeithen,19 the Court held due process rights attach in the
context of an adjudicatory proceeding. The Court applied the test in Hannah to determine
whether an investigative commission’s procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 The commission was to investigate and make findings of fact
regarding violations or possible violations of criminal laws and to supplement and assist
the district attorneys and other law enforcement personnel.21 The commission was
required to report any findings and make recommendations for future actions where it
had probable cause to believe a violation of a criminal law occurred.22 The commission
“very clearly exercises an accusatory function; it is empowered to be used and allegedly
is used to find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal laws.”23 The Court held
due process “requires the Commission to afford a person being investigated the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to traditional
limitations on those rights.”24
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363 U.S. 420 (1960).
Id. at 421–22.
16
Id. at 442–43.
17
Id. at 443.
18
Id. at 451.
19
395 U.S. 411 (1969).
20
Id. at 416–17.
21
Id. at 414–15.
22
Id. at 417.
23
Id. at 427–28.
24
Id. at 429.
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Third, in Aponte v. Calderon,25 the First Circuit discussed Hannah and Jenkins in
determining whether due process rights are implicated in a particular proceeding. A
commission was created by executive order to address issues related to the use of public
resources and government corruption, empowered to conduct investigations, make factual
findings, and issue recommendations against individuals.26 However, the commission
could not initiate or file civil, criminal, or administrative charges or make determinations
regarding criminal liability or probable cause.27 The court concluded that without an
adjudication of legal rights, due process rights were not triggered and therefore did not
apply to the commission, even though the possibility existed that the investigations could
lead to criminal prosecutions.28
Clark County Coroner’s Inquest
In the present case, the provisions fail to provide a clear statement of purpose. The
Court determined, based on the wording of the provisions,29 that the proceedings only
serve a fact-finding and investigatory function because there is no adjudication or
determination of any legal rights.
This makes the inquest proceedings more like the commission in Hannah, being
purely investigative and fact find. Unlike the statutes in Jenkins, the inquest panel is not
authorized to make any recommendations to the district attorneys or any other law
enforcement body,30 nor is the resulting interrogatory allowed to address questions of
fault or guilt.31 Thus, under Hannah, Jenkins, and Aponte, the inquest process does not
trigger due process protections.
Justice of the peace participation in the inquest process violates the Nevada Constitution
The Nevada Constitution expressly provides that only the Legislature has the
authority to determine the jurisdictional limits of the justices of the peace.32 NRS
259.010(2) plainly provides that in counties with appointed coroners, NRS 259.050 does
not apply. Reading NRS 250.010(2) and NRS 259.050(4) together, it is clear that justices
of the peace are only authorized to participate in inquest proceedings in counties where a
county coroner is not appointed.
25

284 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id. at 187.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 193–95.
29
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.080(m)(7) (the presiding officer “shall deal only
with questions of fact and shall not deal with questions of fault or guilt”); CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2.12.140(a) (final interrogatories will “deal only with questions of fact and shall not deal
with questions of fault or guilt”).
30
See generally CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.080 (setting forth the duties and
procedures for the inquest).
31
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.12.080(m)(7); CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2.12.140(a).
32
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 8 (the Legislature “shall fix by law . . . the limits of [justices of the peace’s] civil
and criminal jurisdiction”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370(1) (2007) (justice courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and have only the authority granted to them by statute).
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Clark County has an appointed coroner, and therefore NRS 259.050(4) does not
apply. Thus, justices of the peace are not authorized to participate in Clark County
inquest proceedings.33 The Court considered whether the non-constitutional portion of the
code can be severed under the Court test.34 However, the code provides no alternative to
justices of the peace serving as presiding officers. Striking down only CCCO §
2.12.010(l) would render the entire inquest scheme ineffective because the proceedings
cannot go forward without a presiding officer. Therefore, the remaining portions,
standing alone, cannot be given legal effect and, as a result, the entire inquest scheme
must be struck down.
Conclusion
The provisions setting forth the inquest procedures for officer-involved deaths do
not implicate appellant’s due process rights. However, as far as the provisions requiring
the presiding officer be a justice of the peace, these provisions unconstitutionally intrude
upon the Legislature’s exclusive constitutional authority to determine the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace. Furthermore, because no exceptions exist to allow anyone other
than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer, the entire inquest scheme for
officer-involved deaths is unconstitutional. Therefore the Court reverses the district
court’s decision and vacates the stay of the coroner’s inquest proceedings.
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Nothing in NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.163 (2007) can be construed to authorize justices of the peace
participating in inquest proceedings in counties with appointed coroners.
34
Flamingo Paradise Gaming, 125 Nev. at 514–18, 217 P.3d at 555–57 (a statute is severable only “if the
remaining portion of the statute, standing alone, can be given legal effect, and if the Legislature intended
for the remainder of the statute to stay in effect when part of the statute is severed”).

